In this life, people disagree. According to the CCP, the ten-point gift from the Chinese Communist Party to the Republic of China as mediated by a Kuomintang chairwoman is “aimed at promoting exchange and cooperation with Taiwan” (NHK World, April 12, 2026):
The Taiwan Affairs Office of China’s State Council on Sunday unveiled the 10-point package, which it says is aimed at promoting exchange and cooperation with Taiwan.
The office says China will promote imports of Taiwan’s farm and fishery products and help Taiwan’s small and midsized companies expand their business in China.
Beijing will also fast-track the full resumption of regular direct flights across the Taiwan Strait.
The move came after President Xi Jinping met with Kuomintang chair Cheng Li-wun in Beijing on Friday. These were the first talks between leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT since November 2016.
Xi stressed China’s opposition to “Taiwan independence” while showing willingness to boost dialogue with the KMT, which is seen as more conciliatory toward Beijing.
The last paragraph indicates where differing views of the meeting and its impact, except perhaps the view of the Kuomintang, might converge. The CCP is seeking to boost the standing of the Kuomintang, the ROC’s main opposition party, the party “seen as more conciliatory toward Beijing,” at the expense of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party.
But let’s use the right word: “submissive,” not “conciliatory.” Or some phrase like “more likely to convince the Taiwanese to surrender to Beijing.” If during their epochal meeting Cheng Li-wun challenged Xi Jinping on any of the questions of cross-strait relations that occupy the minds of the Taiwanese—like, Can the People’s Liberation Army leave us alone?—her challenge has yet to make its way into news reports.
Nothingburger
Michael Turton argues that the ten measures proposed by Xi, the fruit of his meeting with Cheng, are despite reporting to the contrary “less a breakthrough than a recycled package of familiar inducements, political leverage and cross-strait illusion” (“The CCP’s 10 measure nothingburger,” Taipei Times, April 16, 2026).
“China on Sunday unveiled 10 new incentive measures for Taiwan,” wrote Reuters, wrongly.
The PRC’s longstanding habit with Taiwan relations is to repackage already extant or once-existing policies and declare that they are “new.” The list forwarded by Cheng reflects that practice.
A few examples:
Note the first item: establishing regular communication mechanisms between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT. The KMT and the CCP are already in regular, intimate contact….
The third measure announced is an old policy: the construction of water, electricity, and energy links to the PRC between coastal Fujian and outlying Kinmen and Matsu islands, a policy long known as the “mini four links.” The PRC has also proposed building bridges to connect the islands to Fujian, which the government has balked at. The PRC has supplied water since 2018, and electricity links have been proposed for years…..
Another “gift” is the expansion of commercial flights between the Taiwan and the PRC. Direct flights are an old policy. Expansions could have been offered at any time.
Turton convincingly describes a proposal to make it easier “for Taiwan’s agricultural and fishery products to enter China” as a political trap and a tech-theft trap.
Since the expansion is based on “upholding the 1992 consensus” and “opposing Taiwan independence,” any perceived failure to obey Beijing on these points will give the CCP a reason to kill the trade expansion it’s now offering and blame the DPP. Taiwanese who are hurt by a cutoff of their products would then have a reason to blame the ruling government.
Moreover, “the PRC seeks to plunder Taiwan’s advanced agricultural and food production technology,” which is also nothing new.
“According to an Asia Times report, by 2012 the PRC had already constructed roughly two dozen ‘Taiwan Farmers Pioneer Parks’ to steal Taiwan agricultural technology. The CCP mouthpiece China Daily reported in January that the Pingtan Agricultural Zone on Pingtan Island in Fujian ‘is set to accelerate the development of a pioneering “common market” between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-30).’ The PRC is simply offering more of what it had already planned.”
The KMT strikes back
In response to the claim by ROC officials that Cheng has been “playing with fire” by making so many groveling concessions to Xi, the Kuomintang has a ready rebuttal.
“Repeatedly using Taiwan’s security as a tool for political struggle is truly playing with fire, and they’ve already gone too far.” So both sides agree that someone has gone too far.
Also see:
Vision Times: “KMT’s Beijing Summit Handed China a Propaganda Win, Taiwan Lawmakers Say”
“The DPP’s sharpest charge was transactional. The party accused the KMT of deliberately stonewalling on arms procurement budgets and blocking negotiations on a Taiwan-U.S. trade agreement…not on principled grounds, but as political payment to Beijing in exchange for access to Xi Jinping…. ‘The Kuomintang must stop serving as a united-front pawn and an internal agent of Taiwan’s destruction,’ the DPP statement read.”
