I don’t remember any stories in 2024 or 2025 about how China Coast Guard vessels and other vessels of the People’s Republic of China have vacated the waters around the Philippines. I remember stories about further CCP aggression against Philippine vessels.
But perhaps I’ve missed a sea change, as it were, in the bigger country’s conduct in the eastern part of South China Sea that the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea.
In a story about successful delivery of supplies “to Disputed South Sea Shoal Amid Tensions,” SSBCrack News reports: “The Philippine military has undertaken numerous supply deliveries to the BRP Sierra Madre, which has been grounded at the shoal since 1999, without any confrontations since a nonaggression agreement was reached between China and the Philippines in July 2024” (September 6, 2025).
July 2024
I remember that agreement. I remember, first of all, that the PRC government and the Philippine government disagreed sharply about what they had supposedly agreed to.
The disagreement about the agreement emerged after the first post-“agreement” resupply of the Sierra Madre. The Philippines reported that its resupply mission had been completed “without incident while Chinese coast guard vessels were at a ‘reasonable distance.’ ” (In other words, were still hovering but not actually smashing Philippine vessels or using water cannons against Philippine vessels, a seminal advance in international relations.)
But the People’s Republic of China quickly made clear that it was under the mistaken or rather pretended impression that the Philippine government had agreed to always notify and in effect ask the permission of the Chinese government whenever resupplying the Sierra Madre. Whereas the Philippine government said that they had agreed to no such thing.
Inference: there was no (actual) agreement.
Nevertheless, it’s possible that the PRC tactic of allowing physically unharassed resupply of the Sierra Madre as a means of asserting their alleged right to control over almost all of the South China Sea did result in additional unhindered resupply missions that, without benefit of the nonagreement, would have been subject to harassment.
August 2024
The nonagreement had taken non-effect in July 2024. By August 20, 2024, however, VOA News was reporting that “Renewed tensions test effort to maintain calm in South China Sea.”
According to VOA News, analysts were saying that “the latest collision between Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels near a disputed reef in the South China Sea is part of a campaign by Beijing to force Manila to soften its position. They say it also raises questions about whether the two can maintain calm, despite reaching a temporary agreement to avoid clashes in July.”
At the time, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning babbled about how China was taking “resolute, forceful measures…to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights” in somebody else’s backyard.
Anybody who knew how the Chinese Communist Party operates had already been entertaining grave doubts way back in July 2024 that the nonagreement would enable “the two” to “maintain calm.” But for sure, China’s continuation of the same old calm-disrupting behavior in August 2024 did not bode well.
September 2024
The Diplomat reported that the “nexus” of tensions in the South China Sea was “shifting. Only weeks after agreeing to a ‘provisional arrangement’ for resupply missions to the Philippine warship-turned-military outpost BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal, Beijing is establishing new fronts in its decades-long dispute with Manila. Chinese fighter jets have since performed dangerous maneuvers against Philippine aircraft at Scarborough Shoal. Members of the Philippine Coast Guard have found themselves under siege amid several ramming incidents around Sabina Shoal.”
December 2024
Associated Press reported that “Philippines says China’s coast guard blasts water cannon and sideswipes patrol vessel.”
A Chinese Coast Guard spokesman warned the Philippines to “immediately stop infringement and provocation and incitement and hype, otherwise, all the consequences caused by this will be borne by the Philippines.”
January 2025
On January 13, 2025, the Inquirer reported that “China’s biggest coast guard vessel, known as ‘The Monster,’ returned to the West Philippine Sea during the weekend, the Philippine Coast Guard said, accusing Beijing of ‘normalizing’ such deployments to ‘alter the existing status quo.’ ”
Philippine officials protested. “You’re pushing us to the wall,” one said. “We do not and will not dignify these scare tactics by backing down.”
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman admonished the Philippines to “immediately stop all infringement, provocation and malicious hype.”
February 2025
On February 3, 2025, Newsweek reported that a China Coast Guard deployment off Luzon had been going on for thirty days.
“Multiple heavily armed Chinese coast guard ships have maintained this presence, well within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone where a country is entitled to resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China claims upward of 90 percent of the South China Sea within its ‘10-dashed line’ map.
“The monthlong deployment brings the long-running territorial dispute with China, typically centered on several contested rocks and reefs, closer to the Philippines proper, further fueling tensions between the two neighbors. Manila has responded with its own coast guard, keeping up the pressure on its Chinese counterpart through continuous monitoring and radio challenges.”
April 2025
Foundation for Defense of Democracies reported that “Chinese Forces Land on Sandy Cay, Escalating Tensions With the Philippines.”
Research analyst Jack Burnham noted that the deployment to Sandy Cay “is the latest escalation of China’s longstanding approach to control its illegal territorial claims, which comprise over 90 percent of the South China Sea. China acts aggressively to secure these claims, including with physical coercion, operations in disputed areas, and militarization of artificial islands. Along with expanding Beijing’s maritime control, these efforts have also allowed China to grow its operational reach across the First Island Chain, which runs from Japan to the coast of Vietnam.”
September 2025
SSBCrack News reports: “The Philippine military has undertaken numerous supply deliveries to the BRP Sierra Madre, which has been grounded at the shoal since 1999, without any confrontations since a nonaggression agreement was reached between China and the Philippines in July 2024” (September 6, 2025).
Yeah? Maybe.
“However,” the same article continues, “recent maneuvers by Chinese forces, including the deployment of better-armed coast guard vessels and a helicopter, have heightened apprehension over potential confrontations.
“Notable incidents include a Chinese vessel firing a water cannon as part of apparent intimidation tactics and proximity encounters, where Chinese boats approached dangerously close to the Philippine outpost. Filipino forces successfully intervened in at least one such situation, blocking a Chinese vessel from coming nearer to the Sierra Madre.”
The article also says: “This ongoing standoff is marked by frequent encounters between Philippine military supply boats and Chinese forces, highlighting the fragility of the underlying diplomatic efforts aimed at maintaining peace in the area.” The first half of this sentence is fine.
