Poonam Sharma offers an explanation of why the Taiwan’s Great Recall movement failed on July 26 (“Taiwan’s Chilling Reality: CCP Is Winning Without Firing a Bullet?,” Global Governance News, July 27, 2025).
The problem of KMT strength in the districts of challenged incumbents was exacerbated by their opponents’ political misjudgments, the most fatal being the reluctance of the Democratic Political Party to fight as hard for the recalls as the Kuomintang has been willing to fight against them.
Imbalanced Political Investment: The KMT machine was mobilized in full to fight the recalls, while the DPP, wary of being accused of orchestrating political revenge, sat on the sidelines.
Tactical Giveaways: The KMT legislated providing economic inducements such as pay raises for military and police and welfare benefits, winning over voters.
Strategic Overreach: Rather than focusing on a few infamous pro-Beijing legislators, the movement tried to remove almost 60% of KMT lawmakers. This repelled centrist voters and mobilized the KMT base.
Mismatch of Priorities: The recall movement was founded in concerns about national security. But KMT stronghold voters ranked local governance above geopolitics.
Hard-to-Win Territories: These were KMT fiefdoms, places where DPP volunteer strength simply could not match the KMT’s local organizational weight.
Why did it become so urgent to regain a DPP majority in the legislature after the elections of January 2024, when the DPP lost its majority even as it retained the presidency? “This division of power gave an unexpected boost to Beijing—and what has transpired ever since is perhaps one of the most underappreciated but profoundly troubling case studies of democratic subversion.”
Taiwan’s 113-seat Legislative Yuan now resides in opposition “Blue Camp” control—led by the pro-Beijing Kuomintang with 52 seats, assisted by centrist Taiwan People’s Party with 8 seats. The ruling DPP is close behind at 51 seats. This paper-thin lead provided fertile ground for the Chinese Communist Party to promote its united front strategy—one that is not aiming to invade, but implode Taiwan inwardly.
Shortly after the elections, a CCP guideline was issued that ordered its Taiwan Affairs Office and the United Front Work Department to call on local penetration networks to take over legislatively. Shortly thereafter, 17 Taiwan legislators, KMT and TPP members among them, went to mainland China for meetings with Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs chiefs—a rare gesture that left pro-democracy groups worried.
The KMT and TPP subsequently established a parliamentary bloc, electing a pro-Beijing-leaning speaker. [They leveraged] their legislative majority to block important bills, such as the all-important national defense budget. They approved reforms that gave greater authority to the Legislative Yuan while subduing Taiwan’s executive branch, directly playing into Beijing’s hands.
The Great Recall movement was a response to this self-sabotage.
What’s next? More CCP-led subversion, possibly including an attempt to implement Victor Gao’s suggestion that China “seize a high-profile leader like President Lai Ching-te, issue emergency decrees under his name, and ‘invite’ mainland security forces onto the island.” Evidence of deep penetration of Taiwanese institutions by agents acting for the Chinese Communist Party means that such schemes are not mere fantasy.
Sharma concludes that war between the mainland and the Republic of China is already happening, “in courtrooms, parliaments, hospitals, and corporate boardrooms. The only question now is not whether the CCP will attempt to take Taiwan. It’s how far along they’ve already come.”
