“Space stalking” pertains to the ability of some satellites to affect the orbit of other satellites (after stalking them, I guess). In The National Interest, Brian Chow quotes a statement from a couple of years ago by the chief of space operations of U.S. Space Force, General B. Chance Saltzman: “We’ve seen a demonstration of a satellite grabbed by another satellite’s robotic arm and pulled out of its mission orbit, and it doesn’t stop at tests.”
This means that space stalking is viable right now. Chow says it’s good that we’re starting to do something to combat it but that the U.S. is way behind where we need to be.
“Currently, these space stalkers can follow US satellites at uncomfortably close ranges during peacetime. With a command from the ground, they could disable or relocate American satellites with minimal debris and limited international outcry.”
Then there’s wartime. China’s space stalkers might “seriously undermine any credible US intervention in a Taiwan crisis by neutralizing key satellite capabilities for early warning, communications, navigation, and surveillance. Our analysis of recent wargames indicated that a debilitating first strike in space would significantly improve China’s chances of successfully executing a sea blockade or full-scale invasion of Taiwan, even in the face of US intervention.”
Golden Dome
Also vulnerable would be President Trump’s proposed Golden Dome missile shield, which would rely on “space-based assets for early warning, tracking, timing, and command, control, and communications. Without adequate protection for these assets, the viability of the Golden Dome—especially during its formative years—would be severely compromised.”
Four years ago, Chow and others estimated that “within several years, China could deploy approximately 200 space stalkers capable of disabling around 100 of the West’s most critical satellites—severely degrading the space architecture that supports US military, civil, and commercial functions in both wartime and peacetime.”
U.S. responses to China’s “focused and sustained development—particularly of space stalkers as a preferred ASAT [anti-satellite] tool” have been “hesitant, inconsistent, and fragmented.”
Bodyguards
Part of the answer is to develop robust bodyguard spacecraft that can zero in on vulnerabilities of a stalker and disable it with robotics or lasers.
And this means funding. The bill that President Trump signed on July 4, 2025, allocates $13.8 billion to the Space Force. Chow says that 200 bodyguard spacecraft would cost $5 billion to $10 billion, and that this should become the top funding priority of Space Force. “The bodyguard system is far simpler, far less costly, and far more urgent than the Golden Dome.”
Also see:
StoptheCCP.org: “Can the United States Fend Off China (and Russia) in Space?”
