“The Vatican has announced two Chinese episcopal appointments in recent weeks,” reports a Catholic blog, “signaling the continuing operation of its eight-year-old agreement with China’s government on the appointment of bishops…. According to the Vatican, both men received papal approval for their appointments under the norms of the Vatican-China deal on June 15” (The Pillar, August 3, 2026).
Is this development good or bad with respect to the prospects for religious freedom in China?
“Patriotic” repression
The writer, Ed Condon, seems to regard himself as not among the critics of the Vatican’s 2018 deal with the Chinese Communist Party. Or, if he does regard himself as such a critic, regards himself as one who is more open than others to the possibility that the deal can somehow be perceived as workable at present or might turn out to be workable—a deal under which no bishop can be appointed to the CCP-controlled Catholic Patriotic Church without Beijing’s approval.
“Both bishops were selected within the CCP-affiliated internal structures of the Church in China and, at least according to the Vatican’s public statements, subsequently presented for formal papal approval—which was granted—before receiving episcopal consecration.”
The qualifying phrase “at least according to the Vatican’s public statements” is proof that the writer is not swimming in naïveté. So is he really on board with the critics of the deal after all? Well…
Given “the Vatican-China deal’s life cycle since 2018, it has to be considered a kind of victory.”
Huh?
Reason: “The previous status quo [after 2018], in which the Communist-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association appeared to appoint bishops at will, with or without a papal mandate, was in many respects worse than the situation before the deal was first agreed. At least in the prior situation [the situation before 2018] there was clarity of status between the schismatic state-sponsored church and the Underground Church in communion with Rome and an obvious distinction between those bishops who were in union with the pope and those who were not. Under Pope Francis, there was essentially no clarity about what was being done licitly on the mainland and what was not, with the Vatican often clearly left in the morally untenable position of having to pretend appointments made without any Roman involvement were pre-approved.”
Thus, prior to the 2018 deal, the Vatican was “at least” not sanctioning the Party’s assaults on religious freedom; or, if it was doing so in some way, at least was not doing so via an opaque agreement to pseudo-collaboratively appoint bishops to the CCP-controlled Catholic Church.
Before 2018, “there was…an obvious distinction between those bishops who were in union with the pope [i.e., bishops in underground churches that do not submit to CCP regulation] and those who were not [i.e., CCP-appointed bishops in the “Patriotic,” CCP-regulated Catholic Church].”
Indeed, Beijing’s post-2018 indifference to or contempt for the Vatican “came to a nadir during the papal interregnum last year, with the CPCA [Chinese Patriotic Catholic Church Association] announcing the ‘election’ and installation of a new bishop when there was no pope to issue a mandate.”
Last year was a year ago. And now—what? Are we suddenly back to the pre-2018 status quo?
Respectful
Not necessarily. But: “Since Leo’s election, Beijing has appeared much more cooperative and respectful of the essential procedural norms of papal approval. The July announcements appear to be a continuation of that shift, with both citing a common June day for the approval of both bishops, which were separately announced on the days of their consecrations.”
Is there something about this “respect” for going through the motions which shows that the bishops being chosen for the CCP-controlled church are no longer the kinds of persons that the CCP can work with?
Condon wants to sort of acknowledge that critics have a point and sort of distance himself from them. We are told that despite the appearance of improvement in relations, “each new mainland appointment continues to be met with a predictable (and not necessarily unreasonable, given recent history) chorus of reflexive criticism and the assumption that every new bishop represents a kind of Roman capitulation to the Chinese government.”
The references to “predictable chorus” and “reflexive criticism” are pejorative. The wording does not convey praise or endorsement; Condon is not hailing the critics for sticking to their guns in light of the fact that there has obviously been no essential change in the nature of the Beijing-enabling compromise or in the nature of the Chinese Communist Party. In Condon’s view, the critics are cogitating with insufficient patience and subtlety. On the other hand—Condon doesn’t want to leave himself out in the cold here—the critics are, he parenthetically stipulates, “not necessarily unreasonable, given recent history.”
But, we’re to understand, the critics might be unreasonable. They might, they might not. How can anyone know? It’s all a fog. Why not wait and see what happens next?
Maybe, despite “recent history,” the intentions and agenda of the Xi-led Chinese Communist Party have changed since the election of Pope Leo.
Nonaligned
After all, “neither of the two new bishops has been portrayed in the media as obviously aligned with either the CPCA or the underground Church, and both have served in pastoral and curial ministry in their dioceses for some years. This may be a reflection of the Church in China becoming—and becoming understood as—less starkly bifurcated than it once was between ‘pro-Rome’ and ‘pro-Beijing’ bishops.”
Or—let me propose another theory—the two new bishops are not “obviously aligned” with either the pro-freedom camp or the pro-tyranny camp because they have been careful not to say anything publicly about which (if any) side they’re on. Maybe awareness that they’re living in a totalitarian dictatorship has something to do with it. Anyway, we know that the bishops are pro-Beijing to this extent: they accepted the appointments and will be bishops of the CCP-controlled Catholic Church, the “Patriotic” Church.
Another Condon example of the less-bifurcated, muddying-of-waters trend is the appointment of “formerly underground Bishop Joseph Lin Yuntuan as an auxiliary bishop of the Archdiocese of Fuzhou.” He received the “vocal support of the Archbishop Joseph Cai Bingrui.” The archbishop, who belongs to the CCP-controlled Church, “championed Lin’s acceptance by the CPCA.”
Why is Lin only a former member of the underground—i.e., non-CCP-regulated—Catholic Church? Why did the archbishop who strongly supported Lin’s appointment do so as a current member of the CCP-controlled Catholic Church? Is it not because they have chosen to submit to CCP regulation of the Church?
Like other Party-regulated churches in the PRC, Party-regulated Catholic churches must, we know, submit “to the CCP’s political agenda and Marxist vision for religion…. Through regulations and state-controlled religious organizations, authorities incorporate CCP ideology into every facet of religious life for Buddhists, Catholic and Protestant Christians, Muslims, and Taoists. They also forcibly eradicate religious elements considered contradictory to the CCP’s political and policy agenda with ultranationalist overtones.
“Government officials have installed CCP loyalists as leading religious figures, altered houses of worship with CCP-approved architecture, integrated CCP propaganda into religious doctrines, and otherwise criminalized non-CCP-backed religious activities,” all with the goal of ensuring the stability of CCP rule.
This summary is provided by a U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom fact sheet.
In conclusion
Condon’s post doesn’t tell us whether he’s okay with the stamping of “Patriotic” churches under the CCP heel or okay with the routine arresting and imprisoning of members of underground churches; the post doesn’t mention them. They’re not among the realities given all due weight in his non-reflexive pragmatic musing.
Maybe things are getting better in Vatican-CCP relations and maybe not, Condon stresses in closing. “As long as new installations are merely acknowledged in real time, though, there will be a sizable body of opinion which holds, or at least is open to the possibility, that the Vatican remains totally sidelined by the CCP and has merely become more efficient at presenting the appearance of involvement.”
Is Condon himself “open to the possibility that the Vatican remains totally sidelined by the CCP and has merely become more efficient at presenting the appearance of involvement”?
Could be! Yes, even though he refers to the “sizable body of opinion” as if he were outside of it. What our noncommittal, detached arbiter doesn’t seem to want to grasp is that even if the Vatican is “really” involved in picking which candidates get the job of submitting as bishops to CCP control of religious practice, this doesn’t change anything. The Vatican would still be accepting CCP control.
