What may Red China have learned about the American military by watching the U.S. wage war in Iran? Four possibilities stand out.
First, the intensity of the opening days seems to have nearly exhausted U.S. munitions (“US munitions depleted by Iran war will take years to restore, analysis finds”). Not only that, but there appear to be no reserve stockpiles; even worse, no capacity to ramp up production in a timely way to offset drawdowns.
Lesson: Bigger stockpiles (and production lines) can persevere longer.
Second, U.S. antiair, anti-drone, and antimissile coverage is limited. Important regional U.S. bases lacked coverage and took major damage, with reports saying that some of the pummeled U.S. installations have been permanently abandoned. Aircraft were destroyed on the ground, important radar installations knocked out, command and communication centers struck. In some cases, inattentive commanders were at fault. But had the U.S. acted to better defend its regional bases, it would have spread its munitions supply ever thinner and with mixed results at best.
Lesson: To get results, saturate targets.
Third, nations hosting U.S. installations are susceptible to pressure. It is unclear whether the U.S. high command expected strikes on its regional bases. Perhaps not. Militarily, the local foreign forces tried to cope with Iranian strikes. Results were mixed. The U.S. is seen as having failed to protect them from attack. Diplomatically, there is a broader problem, typified by reports about how “Gulf allies are quietly starting to break with Washington.”
We must accept that third parties to a conflict want to reduce their exposure to our war. The problem is that our officials don’t think of these states as third parties but as “allies” and refer to them as such. They are not “allies.” They are leaseholders, and no landlord wants fighting and breakage on his property.
Lesson: To generate diplomatic friction, extend the war to U.S. forces in foreign countries.
Fourth, U.S. sensitivity to casualties is acute. This has been a constant since the Vietnam War, but now it seems that even Iraq or Afghanistan levels of casualties are politically unbearable. Part of this is due to lack of Congressional authorization for Iran operations, but much of it is cultural. And so our military has apparently been less than precise about casualties. One extraordinary story from CBS details how our military may be misusing the “not seriously injured” status to reduce concerns from family members of the wounded.
Lesson: To maximize pressure on America, wage information warfare that publicizes casualties.
Republic of China
From Red China’s point of view, there is more to consider in case of war with the United States.
Assuming a war over the Republic of China on Taiwan, Red China will hold the initiative, deciding when and where to strike. The U.S. launched a surprise attack against Iran. But the U.S. will not launch a surprise attack on Red China, a nuclear power. The U.S. will not attack without congressional authorization and public support.
Lacking the element of surprise that it had in Iran, U.S. bases and other military assets will be vulnerable to Beijing’s first move; that first move may include action against satellites, ships, commercial establishments, anything. Like Iran’s retaliatory strikes, Beijing’s first strike will aim at blinding the American forces. Consider what Iran did to that radar installation in Jordan and the U.S. Navy headquarters in Bahrain.
Like Iran, Red China will probably strike the U.S. presence hosted in third countries. The sensible course would be to target those sites in states with the least power of retaliation, such as Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, while weighing carefully the risks of striking targets in Australia, New Zealand, Japan or South Korea.
Beijing’s first strike would impair U.S. fighting ability and likely exhaust its ammunition. It would wreck much of Taiwan in the way that Iran is wrecked now. But as we’ve noted before on this site, Red China cannot easily conquer the island whether or not the U.S. Navy is available to help protect it.
Such a war would result in either a devastating standoff or a surrender by Taipei, which would remove the incentive for the U.S. to continue the fight.
Other lessons
Mick Ryan, a retired Australian major general, suggests that Xi sees a U.S. military that can fight only one war at a time. That’s dangerous.
Craig Singleton, with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, suggests that for Beijing, the Iran war provides “a warning that any Taiwan scenario would immediately implicate global trade, energy flows, and third-party actors in ways that are hard to imagine.” That’s encouraging.
Once Beijing decides on war, though, who knows what considerations will enter its calculations and whether it will be guided by any lessons at all. □
James Roth works for a major defense contractor in Virginia.
