On December 20, 2024, the Ford Foundation funded a gathering of Chinese nongovernmental organizations in Beijing. The NGOs didnโt accomplish anything, aside from successfully concluding their meeting, but the very idea of a communist state having NGOs is startling.
What are they?
The Christian publication ChinaSource offered this explanation in 2002 (emphasis added): โThe so-called NGOs in China are special organizations such as labor unions, the Womenโs Federation, the Communist Youth League, writersโ associations, trade associations and so on. Although they are not officially government agencies, everyone in China knows what they are and their โsemiofficialโ status.โ
Many civilian groups โare trying to form their own NGOs.โ But โin order to obtain legal status, many civilian NGOs have no choice but to align themselves with certain government offices. This process of seeking a relevant government office to โadoptโ their new NGO is called โalign and adopt.โ โ
Align and adopt
Align with what and adopt what? Align with the Communist Party and adopt its objectives.
โIn the garden which is China,โ says ChinaSource, โthese NGOs are like bonsai plantsโplants whose primary purpose is viewing pleasure.โ They present a picture of functioning civil society while providing a supervised outlet for the energies of eccentric activists like environmentalists.
According to Guangyao Chen, a director of Chinaโs Nongovernmental Organizations Administrative Bureau, โThe role of Chinese NGOs is to serve as a bridge for mutual communication that will link government and society and set definite standards for social behavior.โ
In April 2016, Beijing put foreign NGOs under restraints similar to those of the domestic counterparts.
The foreign NGO law โis part of Chinaโs suite of national security laws,โ ChinaFile reports. โThe law imposes costly administrative demands on overseas NGOs that want to register, but with the police as gatekeepers to setting up and maintaining a registered office in China the main challenge has been political rather than bureaucratic.โ
No compromise?
Foreign NGOs that could not get government sponsors left China. Some stayed, offering elaborate rationalizations. In 2021, the Ford Foundationโs Elizabeth Knup (who has since moved on) spoke as clearly as unclarity allows: โAs the representative of an American rights-based social justice foundationย [!] with operations in many challenging contexts around the world, I donโt think of our mission in terms of compromise.โ
But Chinese law places the Ford Foundation under the supervision of the security services, the Foundation is required to have a government sponsor that answers for her deeds and misdeeds, it must file annual plans with the government that align with CCP priorities, and it must submit detailed financials for CCP approval.
Sounds like compromise to the power of ten.
Knup also said: โWe have an obligation to keep working with partners who aspire for [sic] discourse and engagement with the world. We have an obligation to learn how our partners envision progressing toward more equity and human dignity. And we have an opportunity to support and elevate these aspirations, and to keep alive the conversation between visions of social justice in China and the rest of the world.โ
There are a lot of noncommittal, low-expectation outcomes here: โkeep working,โ โlearn how,โ โsupport and elevate aspirations,โ โkeep alive the conversation.โ
If the NGOs are like little bonsai plants, there sure are a lot of them. Estimates of how many operate in China vary widely. In 2016, The Diplomat said 500,000, the highest number reported and perhaps out of date.
Value for value
What do the NGO members get out of this arrangement in which, in the words of Guangyao Chen, they โserve as a bridge for mutual communication that will link government and society and set definite standards for social behaviorโ?
We know that an NGO provides an outlet for the nervous energies of eccentric hobbyists, โcrusadersโ if you will…or busybodies if you prefer. The government can provide NGOs with information, clientele, income, political and administrative support, and legitimacy (prestige). They can also provide the ever-welcome connections.
The benefits, however, are provided within an overarching framework not of the NGOโs making.
The CCPโs 14th Five-Year Plan for Social Organization Development, ending this year, โis the first time that Xi Jinping Thought becomes the sole guiding ideology in a major document regarding social organizations,โ explains researcher Qun Wang.
โDuring this period, government agencies responsible for NGO registration and management must adhere to four basic principles. First, ensuring NGOs submit to the leadership of the CCP and internally strengthen party building. Second, enhancing their political functions and guiding NGOs to โthank the party, listen to the party, and follow the party.โ Third, improving their capacity for fulfilling NGOsโ role in service provision. Fourth, establishing a mechanism to cope with external and internal uncertainties that may cause instability in the nonprofit sector.โ
That fourth item is a puzzler. But note that the CCP has left a little space in the third for the NGO mission if that mission is to deliver a government-approved service. The NGOโs own work, the work for which it was formed, is thus relegated to a distant and uncertain third place.
Thank, listen, follow
So letโs ask a few questions of the Ford Foundation and other foreign NGOs in China: Have you thanked the Party today? Are you listening to the Party today? Are you following the Party today?
For it is your duty to serve the Party at your own expense and at the expense of your donors. โก
James Roth works for a major defense contractor in Virginia.