Xi Jinping and other representatives of the Chinese government have said repeatedly that Taiwan, governed by the Republic of China, is really part of the People’s Republic of China and will inevitably be “reunited” with the mainland either “peacefully” (as a result of successful intimidation) or by force (war).
The assertions aren’t casual. The mainland constantly threatens Taiwan, not only verbally but also by making military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait, and in other ways.
If the ROC does not surrender itself to the mainland, as the people of Taiwan do not seem inclined to do, will the PRC invade? And, if so, will it invade by any particular date?
A recent report regards as an important topic “How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan” (Defense News, May 7, 2024). Presumably, there is no mystery about the more basic question of how China became obsessed with Taiwan—in this case actually obsessed.
Obsession with “obsession”
Words have meanings, or should. An obsession, says Merriam-Webster, is “a persistent disturbing preoccupation with an often unreasonable idea or feeling,” and the government of China clearly harbors an infinity of such persistent disturbing preoccupations. (By “infinity” I mean “a great many.”)
M-W also recognizes an extended meaning, “compelling motivation.” The existence of this secondary meaning allows commentators to sort of half-accuse someone of a persistent disturbing preoccupation with an often unreasonable idea or feeling while being able to fall back on the assertion that what they really mean by “obsession” is something more innocuous.
Humorous, whimsical, or ironic appropriations of terms don’t count as examples of linguistic sloppiness or dishonesty. If the subject is a Calvin Klein cologne, Obsession, nobody or let’s say almost nobody really thinks that someone who prefers Obsession must be obsessed or expect others to become obsessed (sexually?) because he uses it. We can even almost forgive TV channels for babbling about how a new series is viewers’ latest “obsession.”
What does the author of the Defense News piece, Noah Robertson, regard as evidence that “DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan”? Or as evidence that this estimate is a “fixation,” another word Robertson uses?
According to U.S. intelligence, Xi has told the Chinese military it needs to be ready to invade Taiwan by that year. But ready to invade is different than will invade; American officials stress the year isn’t a deadline.
It sounds as if the American officials who stress that the year 2027 isn’t a “deadline” are not obsessed by the possibility that China will invade in 2027.
Defense News spoke to sources in Congress, the Pentagon and Washington-based think tanks to understand what may be the most important, most misunderstood year in Sino-U.S. relations. The message was that 2027 has exposed a rift in Washington’s China strategy. The U.S. is more focused on the country it calls its “pacing challenge,” but experts disagree on whether it’s running a sprint or a marathon—and if it can prepare for both.
We must hope that the mere existence of disagreement among specialists is not by itself evidence that somebody or other among them is “obsessed.”
China “will not renounce the use of force as a possibility” around Taiwan, said David Finkelstein, who studies the Chinese military at the Center for Naval Analyses. “So the military option hangs over the Taiwan Strait like Damocles’ sword.”…
This became the standard line across the administration—affirmed by Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns.
“President Xi has instructed the PLA [People’s Liberation Army], the Chinese military leadership to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan. But that doesn’t mean that he’s decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well,” Burns said during a TV interview in February 2023.
It sounds as if CIA Director Bill Burns is not obsessed by the possibility that China will invade in 2027.
“I hope I’m wrong”
Early in 2023, a general suggested in a leaked memo that “I hope I’m wrong. My gut tells me we will fight [China] in 2025.” Is the wording “I hope I’m wrong but this is how I feel [at the moment]” evidence of “obsession”?
It sounds as if the memo writer, General Mike Minihan, is not obsessed by the possibility that China will invade in 2025 or 2027.
After this last case, the Pentagon intervened. Officials began repeating a new talking point: Conflict with China is “neither imminent nor inevitable.” They’ve stuck to that assessment ever since.
It sounds as if Pentagon officials are not obsessed by the possibility that China will invade in 2027. At least not publicly.
But by then, said a senior defense official, granted anonymity to speak freely, the concerns around 2027 had spread widely.
It sounds as if many people had concerns “around” 2027.
People around Washington would call the official’s office to ask if China would invade that year and whether the U.S. is ready. Since then, the official said, the misconception has become less common.
It sounds as if the belief or “misconception,” if it is a misconception, that 2027 was a scheduled date of invasion then became less common. People made a mistake—if the conclusion that 2027 is a deadline for Xi is really a mistake. Then people stopped making this mistake or purported mistake. “Obsession”? “Fixation”?
Xi Jinping reportedly denies that 2027 is a deadline for invading Taiwan. But this report doesn’t mean anything. Suppose 2027 is indeed a deadline for Xi, that he wants his military not only to be “ready” to invade Taiwan in 2027 but to actually invade in that year. It’s on his calendar, and he will be getting automated text and email reminders in December 2026. If this were true, why would he publicly confirm it?
The U.S. military does not seem to be disturbingly preoccupied by an assumption that China will likely invade Taiwan in 2027. Whether decision makers should be compelling motivated by such an assumption, I don’t know.
At any rate, the U.S. should fixedly assume that China is not twiddling its thumbs about its determination to grab Taiwan and that it may well attempt to grab it unless deterred. One clue or avalanche of clues is everything China says and does in relation to Taiwan.
Also see:
StopTheChinazis: “What Is This ‘Republic of China’?”
StopTheChinazis: Video: “Why Should Americans Defend Taiwan?”
