Plunging in media res of a debate about whether there can be a plausible argument for (some) protectionism as national U.S. policy, we find that Michael Dougherty in defending his pro-some-protectionism views makes several claims that can be considered apart from the context of his argument with David Bahnsen (National Review, August 12, 2025). Let’s look at a couple of these claims.
Some versus none
The case for (some) protectionism, if we want to call it “protectionism,” is the case for deviating from a U.S. national policy of unfettered trade with all other countries (unfettered on the U.S. side).
A consistent free-trade policy would, supposedly, be a policy of no tariffs on any imports and no other restrictions—by the U.S.—on international trade. That is, the U.S. would, for example, impose no restrictions on sales of particular items to certain countries, like sales of mega-powerful chips and other potent computer tech to the People’s Republic of China. Few persons advocate either autarky, with the U.S. engaging in zero international trade; or that the U.S. impose no legal limits whatever on what a U.S. company may send to a foreign country.
Are there any reasons that can be grounded in principled, rational self-interest for prohibiting U.S. residents and nationals from helping an arch-enemy government to more effectively harm the United States? Is there warrant under a national defense policy (as opposed to a national surrender policy) for acting to reverse, inhibit, prevent, and stop the enabling and strengthening of an enemy government like that of the PRC? Would a desire to survive, remain free, things like that, constitute appropriate justification for declining to equip a totalitarian government and facilitate its agenda?
In the posts of this website, we’ve tried to outline what the Chinese Communist Party is up to that would justify cause for overriding concern. Dougherty, summarizing the problem, compares the relatively free circumstances of the “domestic market of the United States” with the situation in Red China, “which has hundreds of millions of unfree workers, a far more aggressive industrial policy, a government-encouraged policy of intellectual-property theft, government control that can enforce a joint domestic venture on most American firms trying to enter it, a government that lies about its environmental standards, and one that is far more aggressive about building infrastructure and delivering energy to sectors of the economy that its geopolitical strategy sees advantage in capturing.”
A non-exhaustive list, but indicative. Dougherty and I agree in our perception of China; although CCP permits markets in some form to function, “free” trade is no part of its domestic or foreign policies.
Principles
We seem to disagree about the other matter I want to comment on, Dougherty’s apparent acceptance of a dichotomy between a principled approach to national defense or trade policy—or anything—and a prudent one. This dichotomy isn’t developed at any length in Dougherty’s current article but seems to be implied by such a statement as this: “I tried to warn against this or demands for ‘limiting principles’ by showing that free trade’s historical critics viewed these as matters of prudence, not principle.” Dougherty also offers an apparently denigrating allusion to the “absolutism” of principles or their application.
Only by neglecting what properly counts as rational principles and as rational prudence can being principled and being prudent be regarded as somehow inherently opposed to each other.
Principles may be valid or invalid. Valid principles are fundamental generalizations objectively derived from experience (the facts). Principles take facts into account and they are applicable to facts not contained in the statement of the generalization. Some principles are more foundational than others, and, if true, can be elaborated by or refined by but not contradicted by more derivative generalizations. Every field has principles. So does the field of morality. Moral principles, which are basic guides to human action, inform political principles and governance.
The fact that the realities which we confront as appliers of moral principle are often complicated does not mean that it is wrong to go by principles and that we must instead be “prudent.” It means that we must be scrupulous—prudent—in forming and in applying principles and in taking into account all relevant facts. If we take care to go by valid principles, going by principles is itself a prudential act. What else could it be? We need principles in order to acquire knowledge and in order to live as human beings.
Nor does erring in the formulation of a principle demonstrate that principles are untenable as guides to action. What one does in that case is correct the error—as the principle that you should absolutely always go by reason and reality would tell you.
Also see:
StoptheCCP.org: Beyond U.S. and Chinese Tariffs: Understanding Nontariff Barriers to Trade
StoptheCCP.org: Cutting Off Knowledge of China and Trade Makes Arguments Poorer
