Well…no.
We have recently had references to “the deepening strategic alliance between China and Iran” and headlines such as “Iran, China reaffirm commitment to strategic partnership.”
Trade agreements and arms sales do not make an alliance, which would involve military commitments like defense treaties, bases, troops.
Among closest
Late last year, the speaker of Iran’s Parliament, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, said that “China stands among our closest allies.”
But after a few rounds of missile strikes, we heard from “former Global Times editor Hu Xijin, who led the nationalistic [communistic] state-run newspaper from 2005-2021.” He said, “From a realist perspective, Iran should rethink its nuclear path.”
Doesn’t sound like an alliance is at work here. This is no pact of steel.
In their story, the journalists reporting Qalibaf’s “closest allies” remark wisely reframe the relationship as being rather a “strategic partnership.” This is a mushy term which means that the two sides have agreed to pursue some nonmilitary aims that can be characterized as strategic.
In mid-June, one writer mused, “a second Chinese transport plane has reportedly landed in Iran, sparking fears that Beijing is quietly bolstering its strategic ally.” This is another promotion of “strategic partnership” to “alliance.” The same writer notes that “The Iran-China 25-year Cooperation Program, signed in 2021, underscores this relationship. China committed $400 billion to Iran’s economy, including oil, gas, and infrastructure, in exchange for heavily discounted oil.” This “relationship,” an economic agreement, does not make them allies.
Perhaps there is a secret military agreement between Red China and Iran. But if so, the people referring to an “alliance” don’t know about it—or they would tell us. Meanwhile, there is the “2016 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with Beijing [that] lays the foundation for deeper economic and infrastructural cooperation.” In a confused mind, this agreement can get inflated into an “alliance.” But it is not comprehensive.
What exactly?
The website Total Military Insight does some relationship mapping for us: “Historically, China has been a significant arms supplier to Iran, particularly during periods of international isolation.” These are arms for oil transactions, are they not? “The cooperation has gained momentum in recent years, marked by high-level visits and defense agreements that highlight the strengthening ties between the Iranian Armed Forces and the Chinese military.” Details please. Drones for port visits? Pistachios for rifles? Free tuition at military academies?
Total Military Insight wisely refers to the relationship at a “partnership,” never as an “alliance.” “Partnership” can mean anything.
Meanwhile, Press TV, an Iranian outlet, late last month let slip an interesting fact, that during an upcoming visit to Beijing the Iranian president “would focus on implementing the existing agreements.”
Unfulfilled agreements = a partnership that needs patching up.
One analyst believes that Red China and Iran will never get there. Looking at the recent (or ongoing) Israel–U.S.–Iran combat, Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says that communist China “sticks to rhetoric—condemnations, UN statements, talk of ‘dialogue’—because over-promising and under-delivering would spotlight its power-projection limits. The result is a conspicuously thin response that underscores how little real heft China brings to Iran when the shooting starts.”
“Iran needs more than statements at the UN or missile components,” says Andrea Ghiselli, who teaches at the University of Exeter. “It needs air defenses and fighter jets, which are things that China could provide but would require much time to be put into use—not to mention the likely extremely negative reaction by Israel and, especially now that it is directly involved, the US.”
Talk deliverer
Red China, then, is not an ally but a partner that can be counted on to deliver talk when the chips are down.
Despite all the “ally” and “partner” reporting, Beijing stands to gain from a prolonged Iranian war.
While acknowledging that a “destroyed” Iran is “detrimental to China’s geopolitical interests,” Tian Wenlin, the director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at Renmin University of China, said “this conflict may cause the United States to be more deeply involved in the Middle East, which may lead to a relatively longer period of strategic opportunities for China.”
Second, China will use the Iran war—like the wars in Gaza and Ukraine—to make the case that the U.S.-led international order is unstable and unfair for everyone but U.S. allies.
“Strategic opportunities” mean that certain options become more attractive…that benefits can be reaped elsewhere. The communists need Iranian oil, but Iran has thus far failed to leverage this need into an alliance or even a more helpful partnership.
If a continued war favors Red China, Beijing will continue to make a poor “ally” or even a useful “partner.” Continue to count the communists out on this one. □
James Roth works for a major defense contractor in Virginia.
