Is Beijing intensifying its efforts to spy on, bully and woo the Taiwanese? Or does it look that way because the Republic of China is doing more to combat those efforts? Perhaps it’s both.
The People’s Republic of China is “stepping up transnational repression and ‘united front’ operations against Taiwan using surveillance, intimidation and violence to silence targeted Taiwanese, the National Security Bureau said in a report submitted yesterday to the Legislative Yuan” (Taipei Times, October 21, 2026).
More spying?
Certain numbers are increasing. In 2020, six people were indicted in Taiwan for spying for the CCP. In 2026 so far, the number is 73. The count does not include cases prosecuted under the 2019 Anti-Infiltration Act, which prohibits lobbying, influencing elections, making political donations, and other non-spying things done on behalf of an external hostile force.
I couldn’t find an English-language version of the new NSB report. But an earlier Bureau report (maybe from 2025) notes that “the number of individuals prosecuted for Chinese espionage has increased significantly” in recent years, “with 48 in 2023 and 64 in 2024, representing a sharp increase compared to 2021 and 2022. In addition, the number of prosecuted cases has also risen from 3 cases in 2021 and 5 cases in 2022 to 14 cases in 2023 and 15 cases in 2024. (Cases involved in Anti-Infiltration Act are not included.)”
The same earlier report summarizes five channels of infiltration and four tactics of infiltration:
Analyzing the patterns of espionage cases in 2024, it is observed there are five primary infiltration channels, such as gang groups, underground banks, front companies, temples and religious groups, as well as local associations. Also, by employing the four infiltration tactics, including using retired servicemembers to recruit active ones, establishing networks through the internet, lure of money, and coercing individuals by exploiting their debts, China conducts infiltration into Taiwan’s military units, government agencies, and pro-China organizations. Such efforts aim to gain access to sensitive intelligence of Taiwan’s national defense, and to develop espionage and co-optee networks in Taiwan, and even to intervene in Taiwan’s democratic elections.
Taipei Times:
China has also sought to poach Taiwanese talent, steal technology and acquire advanced chips by posing as foreign investors and using indirect procurement channels to evade restrictions, the [new NSB] report said.
Since 2020, authorities have uncovered 151 cases involving Chinese-funded entities operating in Taiwan without approval or attempting to recruit local talent, as well as 50 cases of technology theft linked to China, the NSB said.
Beijing has also sought to influence Taiwan’s elections through illicit funding, sponsored trips to China, donations of campaign materials and fabricated opinion polls, the report said.
The Chinese Communist Party has enlisted “overseas and local collaborators to monitor and film specific Taiwanese, gathering personal information that could be used to threaten or intimidate them, the report said.” Intimidatory tactics deployed against critics of Beijing including impersonating them to try to harm their reputations, physically assaulting them, and victimizing them in traffic “accidents.”
In its recent reports, the NSB does not seem to relate the incidents of spying, intimidation and influence of the last several years to the trends of earlier years.
Whether or not the frequency of all this is increasing, it’s happening, and continuously.
Also see:
National Security Bureau: “Analysis on the Infiltration Tactics Concerning China’s Espionage Cases” (2025?)
This five-page report, which finds “a significant enhancement in public awareness of counterintelligence and national security,” is undated but includes data from no later than 2024.
