Compare and contrast. A survey of cyber attacks on the U.S. tallied 480,000 for 2022. But in 2024, Taipei’s Government Service Network suffered, on average, 2.4 million attacks a day. Double the 1.2 million attacks a day of 2023.
Cyberattacks on the Republic of China, overwhelmingly from the People’s Republic of China, are orders of magnitude more frequent than attacks on the United States. And yet “many of those attacks [on Taiwan networks] have been effectively detected and blocked.”
Back at the ranch
Closer to home, the track record of detection and blocking tells a different story. In a year when China’s penetration of America’s major telco networks was disclosed, December 2024 brought the discovery of a major Chinese penetration of the U.S. Treasury Department.
One recalls that memorable prophecy about “a pitiful, helpless giant.”
What could be the purpose of attempting many millions of hacks against a network? The consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton says that Beijing “has a Taiwan cyber strategy for annexing Taiwan without an invasion…. The aim is to isolate, weaken, and absorb Taiwan in the long run. This is done through spying, stealing data, spreading lies,” etc.
More specifically, the Global Taiwan Institute says that “analysis of Chinese cyberattacks on Taiwan reveals multifaceted strategic objectives, including the acquisition of sensitive intelligence crucial for cross-Strait negotiations and the illicit procurement of Taiwanese trade and industrial secrets.”
The attacks also “aim to subvert democratic institutions by disseminating disinformation, disrupting governmental operations through targeted assaults on critical infrastructure, impeding service delivery, and undermining public trust in governmental efficacy, ultimately eroding confidence in democratic processes.”
Defense and offense
The Republic of China is not a pitiful, helpless giant, however. It has been able to defend against a massive threat at scale and will probably be able to continue to do so. CNN reports that “Successful breaches number in the hundreds, while only a handful are what the government classifies as ‘serious.’ ”
The ROC also has an offensive capability. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that “Taiwan is an advanced cyber actor that has successfully and repeatedly breached key Chinese systems for over a decade. Over the last five years, Taiwan has developed organizational structures for offensive cyber capabilities.”
In September, Beijing complained that an ROC hacking group called Anonymous 64 was spreading “anti-propaganda sabotage.” (Presumably this means sabotage of communist propaganda.) Anonymous 64 also pushed content “that denigrates the mainland’s political system and major policies,” its messages breaking into websites, outdoor screens and network TV stations. Taipei denied the accusation.
Beijing’s interests stretch beyond the ROC. “Hackers associated with China’s Ministry of State Security have been linked to attacks in 17 different countries in Asia, Europe, and North America from 2021 to 2023,” a hacker website reports.
From the PRC’s warped perspective, some of these targets are logical, such as Japan. Others are a little strange, such as Paraguay. Paraguay recognizes the ROC, but still.
Authoritarian model
Also concerning is Beijing spreading its authoritarian model of internet governance. The human rights group Article 19 notes that “dual infrastructure and policy support from [Red] China, in the hands of authoritarian states, has contributed to increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and information, the right to privacy, and other acts of digital repression.”
Quite simply, “China is seeking to create a China-centric global alternative to current technological standards and digital governance norms. By expanding its authoritarian model, China aims to ultimately supplant the tenets of internet freedom and rights-based principles of global digital governance.” Cambodia, Nepal, and Thailand seem to be on board with Beijing-style governance, and Malaysia is wavering.
Not surprising that the ROC’s “approach to cybersecurity governance is a critically more rights-based approach,” one that sharply contrasts with that of Red China. The Diplomat suggests that “the international community should [therefore] empower Taiwan to play a more active role in international norms setting.”
Trying to help
Meanwhile, the U.S. government is trying to be helpful, internationally, with cyber defense.
In April 2023, the U.S. passed S.1241, the Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act of 2023, which “shall seek to engage the Government of Taiwan for the purpose of expanding cooperation on military cybersecurity activities.”
Last year Taipei joined the ninth U.S. “Cyber Storm” exercise, which involved nine nations and “2,200 participants from 300 organizations, over 80 private industry partners, and 35 federal departments and agencies.” This defensive drill “involved simulation of discovery and mitigation of large-scale and coordinated digital attacks that real-world actors conduct to infiltrate critical infrastructure.”
But given its track record as a cyber victim, does the United States have enough expertise to share? One hopes that the U.S. was in listen-and-learn mode.
If the record is correct and Beijing’s attacks on the U.S. harvest rich bounties while its attacks on Taipei are frustrated, what can possibly justify the expense and manpower China needs to launch 2.4 million failed hacks per day? Perhaps it’s just make work or another failed government program.
But if the communists ever launch those 2.4 million cyber assaults per day against the United States, one shudders to think… □
James Roth works for a major defense contractor in Virginia.
