Tall order. After perusing a 4,100-word overview of totalitarian China’s incursions and partnerships in the vicinity of India, can the reader find plausible the prospect of “addressing and remedying this asymmetry to establish workable, long-lasting, nonconfrontational equilibrium with China”?
Is this a “challenge” that is somehow doable even if difficult?
India can cope with a belligerent China. But a “nonconfrontational” resolution or equilibrium is a pipe dream (“India Today: In a challenging neighborhood,” Countercurrents.org, January 25, 2025)?
Countercurrents writer S.G. Vombatkere discusses:
Pakistan and Bangladesh. “The China-Pakistan axis…is not new.” But the partnership between China and Bangladesh “has been consolidated by a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership [in] 2024, as part of the BRI [China’s Belt and Road Initiative], and in furtherance of their strategic partnership of cooperation established in 2016.”
As well, “Bangladesh has made overtures to Pakistan, brushing aside the latter’s genocide of 1970-71.” Military cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh “effectively cements a deeply troubling India-hostile relationship, because India has disputed borders with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh.”
Nepal. Nepal has been infiltrated by China, “and reportedly China has even established military posts in 150 hectares of land within Nepal’s border.”
Bhutan. In 2017, “Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward into the Doklam plateau, a territory claimed by both China and Bhutan. Two days later, Indian troops advanced through Sikkim towards Doklam, facing off the PLA, and only thereafter Bhutan objected to Chinese presence in Doklam.”
Despite China’s alleged withdrawal from the area in 2017, “China has reportedly constructed a ‘resettlement village’ within territory claimed by both Bhutan and China in the Doklam area.” Vombatkere believes that Bhutan is likely to establish formal diplomatic relations with China, sign a boundary agreement, and join the Belt and Road Initiative.
Myanmar. “China has supplied Myanmar with jet fighters, armoured vehicles and naval vessels, and has trained Burmese army, air force and naval personnel since 1989. Thus, China has had access to Myanmar’s ports and naval installations, plus strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal, in the wider Indian Ocean region and in Southeast Asia.”
Sri Lanka. “The geo-economic importance of the Indian Ocean for China’s energy needs has caused China to extend its BRI reach into Sri Lanka, by financing infrastructure projects.” In 2017, when Sri Lanka failed to repay China’s loans to help it build the Hambantota International Port, it gave China a 99-year lease to run the port.
“Sri Lanka cannot but be aware of the implications of China using HIP for covert military purposes. The foregoing indicates that Sri Lanka has chosen to align its interests with China, even at the cost of incurring India’s displeasure. By this choice, Sri Lanka has made itself a virtual outpost for China and alienated itself from India for the foreseeable future.”
Maldives. Although India has longtime “historical and cultural ties with Maldives,” established diplomatic relations in 1965, and even sent paratroopers into Maldives in 1988 to defeat a coup attempt at the Maldivian government’s request, Maldives is now entangled with China, having joined the BRI in 2014. “Since then, Maldives has borrowed about $1.4-billion from Chinese banks, in addition to China’s large investments for infrastructure projects. In March 2024, Maldives signed 20 new agreements, including [for] financial and military assistance from China.”
Add to the above China’s “greatly increased…army and air force presence right across Tibet and in Aksai Chin” and “China’s encroachment by ‘salami-slicing’ into India’s territory at several places in shared land borders.”
An Indian minister says that in the future, relations between India and China should be based on “mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual sensitivity.” The emergence of these will be a sure sign of nonconfrontational equilibrium.
